A recent US report highlighting China's designation of Arunachal Pradesh as a "core interest" has reignited focus on the protracted boundary dispute. This development, coupled with the arbitrary detention of an Indian national from Arunachal in Shanghai, underscores the persistent tensions. To understand the historical roots and current strategy, we turn to insights from Ashok K Kantha, former Indian Ambassador to China and a key negotiator in past border talks.
The Contested Origins: McMahon Line and the Birth of the LAC
The historical bedrock of the dispute in the Eastern Sector lies in the McMahon Line, established during the 1913-14 Simla Conference. Ambassador Kantha clarifies that this boundary was formalized through an exchange of letters between British Indian and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries in March 1914. "At that time, Tibet was fully entitled to enter into treaties," he notes, adding that China's initial refusal to sign the final convention was related to internal Tibetan divisions, not the India-Tibet boundary itself.
The concept of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) entered the lexicon through Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai's letter to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in November 1959. Zhou defined it as the line up to which each side exercised actual control and proposed mutual withdrawals. India rejected this, viewing it as an attempt to legitimize China's hold on Aksai Chin in the West.
Following the 1962 war, an LAC emerged as a de facto reality. However, Kantha points out a critical flaw: "The Chinese concept of the 'LAC of 7 November 1959' was a flexible and movable construct." In Ladakh, it was aligned with a Chinese claim line that had aggressively expanded since 1956. In the East, while China agreed the LAC coincided with the McMahon Line, it insisted on a literal, and often illogical, interpretation of old maps, differing from India's watershed principle.
Managing the Border: From Agreements to Stalemate
India pragmatically accepted the LAC concept during negotiations leading to the landmark 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA). "It was a pragmatic change in India’s position," Kantha states, driven by live border tensions in the late 1980s. The agreement committed both sides to respect the LAC pending a final settlement, creating a framework for confidence-building measures (CBMs).
A crucial step was envisioned in the 1996 military CBM agreement, which called for a "common understanding" of the LAC alignment through map exchanges. While maps for the Middle Sector (Uttarakhand, Himachal) were swapped by 2002, the process stalled. "Maps were prepared for the Western Sector, but China refused the exchange, saying India had inflated its claim," Kantha reveals. The process broke down around 2004 and has seen no progress since.
"The bottom line," Kantha emphasizes, "is that the Chinese are using ambiguity on the LAC and unsettled borders as a major pressure point against us." This ambiguity allows for strategic probing and incremental changes on the ground.
Arunachal Pradesh and China's Shifting Negotiation Stance
Despite China's claims, India is in effective control of Arunachal Pradesh up to the watershed boundary, with only three small pockets in what is termed "adverse possession." However, China has significantly hardened its position over decades. Kantha outlines the reversal: from Zhou Enlai's 1960 hint at a "realistic view" of the McMahon Line, to Deng Xiaoping's 1979 "package proposal" (concessions in the East for concessions in the West), to a complete volte-face by 1985.
"They said the area of 'greatest difference' was in the Eastern Sector, and India must make 'substantive concessions' there," he explains. This demand for major adjustments in Arunachal, particularly around Tawang, persisted during the 2005 boundary settlement talks. Although India secured a clause to protect settled populations, China soon resurrected its "Zangnan" or "South Tibet" narrative for Arunachal.
Today, claims are asserted more stridently through grey zone operations—renaming places, harassing Indian nationals from the state, and incremental military moves—all while avoiding full-scale conflict. The 2020 Galwan clash in Eastern Ladakh is a prime example. Kantha warns that unfinished disengagement there and patrolling restrictions could lead to permanent, unfavorable changes.
A significant shift, he notes, is that China no longer differentiates the LAC from sovereignty issues. President Xi Jinping's firm stance on territory and the expanding use of the term "core interests" signal a more uncompromising posture. "Today, China is no longer interested in an early boundary settlement," Kantha concludes. "They believe time is on their side... We must guard against the recurrence of Eastern Ladakh-type Chinese operations across the LAC in the Eastern Sector."
