Surrendered Maoist Commander Details Decisive Shift in Long-Running Conflict
In a revealing interview from Hyderabad, a surrendered Maoist battalion commander has stated that the balance in the long-running conflict shifted decisively not merely due to aerial firepower, but because of a combination of sustained mortar attacks, expanding security grids, and shrinking forest sanctuaries that critically eroded guerrilla mobility.
Cumulative Impact of Security Measures
Barise Sukka, also known as Deva, a former battalion commander of the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army, explained that the cumulative impact of several factors steadily weakened Maoist operational capacity. He highlighted the use of 81mm mortars, the proliferation of security camps, mine-protected vehicles, extensive informer networks, and District Reserve Guard units familiar with local terrain as key elements in this decline.
"In war, police also die, and we also die — I was not trigger happy; killing was never for pleasure," Sukka told TOI, while admitting mistakes in specific operations and in the broader course of the movement. Reflecting on his surrender, he added, "Party is ending. Where will I go? I have to go to my village." His palms were rough and battle-scarred, and he remained largely expressionless during the three-hour interaction.
Mortars and Shrinking Space: A New Phase
Sukka emphasized that the conflict entered a new phase when security forces began sustained use of 81mm mortars. He described the impact as both physical and organisational, preventing Maoist units from holding positions effectively. "When 81mm mortars began landing, the ground war changed," he said, noting that shelling disrupted formations and curtailed movement significantly.
Referring to the 2025 Karreguttalu operations, he stated that mortar fire combined with heavy ground deployment proved more consequential than aerial firing alone. He also alleged drone surveillance and bombing, as well as helicopter firing, claiming flight patterns shifted to higher altitudes after Maoists hit one aircraft. The area was heavily mined, and the tactical cycle of operations from February to June continued under increasingly constrained conditions.
Sukka denied surrendering for money, revealing that police recovered weapons from a hidden dump using GPS coordinates recorded in a diary. "Weapon is not big; courage matters," he reflected, discussing ideology and changing realities. He observed that villages increasingly demanded electricity, healthcare, and roads, and that the movement had reached an endpoint for him. "After the surrender, I met my mother, wife, and kids. I was here in Hyderabad. I want to go home," he expressed.
Security forces utilize the 81mm mortar as an indirect fire weapon in counter-insurgency and jungle warfare operations, with an effective range of up to approximately 6 kilometers.
Initial Training and Involvement in Major Attacks
A Koya tribal from Puvarthi village in Sukma district, Sukka joined the Maoist movement in 2003 after mobilization drives in his area, including cultural programmes by Chetana Natya Mandali. He described slain commander Madavi Hidma as a childhood friend and mentioned that senior leaders such as Mallojula Venugopal alias Sonu and Sujathakka inspired villagers to join.
He underwent initial training in Pamedu and advanced military instruction in 2009, covering ambush tactics, raids, reconnaissance, movement tracking, and armed operations. Police records describe him as a trainer in trekking, firing practice, IED planning, and physical conditioning.
Sukka claimed involvement in several major attacks, including the 2010 Singaram blast and the 2013 Jhiram Ghati ambush. He stated that Congress leader Mahendra Karma was the intended target at Jhiram and that it was not the plan "to kill everyone", though he acknowledged the killings and called it a mistake in hindsight. In some ambushes, he said, personnel were asked to surrender, but exchanges of fire followed. "CRPF personnel never surrender. They will fight till death and say ‘Bharat mata ki jai' even at the end," he recalled.
Terrain Advantage Eroded Over Time
According to Sukka, Maoists initially benefited from intimate terrain knowledge, local support, and ambush positioning. However, this advantage diminished as DRG units and Koya commandos — many with local roots or former cadre backgrounds — strengthened operations. "They know the place. They know the people," he noted.
Road construction, frequent patrols, helipads, and new camps fundamentally altered the battlefield by cutting forest routes and enabling rapid troop movement. Mine-protected vehicles posed a particular challenge, as guerrillas struggled to neutralize them effectively. Weapon shortages compounded difficulties; Sukka mentioned that barrel grenade launchers malfunctioned during an attempted camp attack and that rocket launchers and RPG systems were scarce.
As an IED specialist, he explained that explosives were typically made using slurry or ammonium nitrate. Even so, many ambushes failed, with successful attacks requiring days of surveillance and precise timing, he added.
