A dramatic scene unfolds just five miles from Taiwan's coastline. Chinese ZTD-05 amphibious assault vehicles surge out of naval ships, speeding across the water under a barrage of artillery fire. The soldiers inside have a grim, singular objective: capture the beachhead at any cost, even if it means death. Nearby, the situation is equally dire for China's airborne troops. Having arrived before dawn in low-flying Y-20 transport planes to seize Taoyuan International Airport, they now face heavy losses. Taiwanese air defenses have shot down several aircraft, scattering the surviving paratroopers who now race to secure the airfield before it can be destroyed by defenders.
The World's Biggest Geopolitical Gamble
This intense battle is, for now, a hypothetical scenario—one being meticulously studied by militaries, policymakers, and war-gamers worldwide. It imagines a full-scale Chinese invasion of Taiwan, an operation experts consider one of the most difficult to execute in modern warfare. The consequences of such an all-out war would be catastrophic: extremely high casualties, devastation of the global economy, and a permanent shift in the course of the 21st century.
The central question facing global geopolitics is whether Beijing will ever attempt to conquer the democratically governed island by force. A very close second is how the United States, Taiwan's primary defense partner, would respond. While a hot war is not seen as inevitable, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has explicitly directed his military planners to prepare for such a contingency, fueling a rapid peacetime military buildup.
The Three Phases of a Potential Invasion
How would a Chinese invasion actually unfold? The answer depends heavily on Taiwan's resistance, the scale of U.S. intervention, and the coordination of Chinese forces across air, sea, land, and cyber domains. Based on Chinese military doctrine and analysis by Western experts, the campaign would likely proceed in three broad phases.
The first phase is a massive firepower strike. China would unleash a "joint firepower strike," pounding Taiwan with hundreds of missiles. The goals are multifaceted: to "soften" Taiwanese defenses by destroying air defense systems, airbases, command hubs, ammunition depots, and coastal artillery; to create safer passage for Chinese ships across the Taiwan Strait; to break Taiwan's will to fight; and to dissuade U.S. intervention with a overwhelming show of force. The Rocket Force, a full military branch for a decade, boasts an arsenal of roughly 3,500 missiles of varying ranges for this purpose. A critical decision for planners would be the bombardment's duration—a drawn-out campaign risks giving the U.S. time to mobilize, but a shorter one might fail to eliminate key Taiwanese capabilities.
The second, and most perilous, phase is the amphibious crossing and landing. This is where Chinese ships would be vulnerable to sinking, and landing forces could be decimated in the water or on the beaches, echoing the bloody battles of World War II. The invasion would begin with the massive mobilization of thousands of troops and millions of tons of equipment to China's coast, a move that could alert adversaries. However, since 2022, China has used increasingly complex military exercises around Taiwan as potential cover, possibly masking preparations for a rapid, high-intensity attack.
Choosing landing sites presents a tactical dilemma. Landing in southern Taiwan might mean lighter initial resistance, as Taiwan's army is concentrated in the north, but would require a difficult overland campaign to reach Taipei. A northern approach puts forces closer to the capital but guarantees fierce resistance on fortified beaches. The spearhead of the assault would likely be the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) six amphibious combined arms brigades—an A-team of roughly 30,000 troops and over 2,400 vehicles. They would cross the strait on ships and launch into the water in armored vehicles. China has also rapidly expanded its marine corps from two brigades in 2017 to eleven today.
A major debate centers on China's sealift capacity. Its navy has dozens, not hundreds, of dedicated amphibious ships. To bridge the gap, the military would heavily rely on a secondary source: modified civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries and cargo ships built to defense standards. These vessels, with reinforced ramps, could disembark armored vehicles directly into the water. The challenge, experts note, would be organizing these civilian ships into protected convoys under combat conditions.
The Decisive Push for Taipei
The third phase is the breakout and seizure of Taipei. A successful beach landing only provides a foothold. To capture the capital, China would need to land hundreds of thousands of follow-on troops along with heavy equipment like tanks and vast logistical supplies. The most efficient way to do this is by seizing a major port. "If they take a port it's kind of game over," said Thomas Shugart, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. This would allow China to flood the island with civilian ferries and cargo ships carrying the bulk of its invasion force.
To prevent this nightmare scenario, Taiwanese forces would likely sabotage their own ports or sink ships in channels to block access. China has developed a new capability to counter this: mobile pier systems consisting of three barges that can create a 2,700-foot causeway directly onto a beach or a damaged port, allowing for the rapid offloading of hundreds of vehicles. However, these piers are vulnerable and could only be used once a beachhead is fully secured.
Ultimately, if China manages to land a large enough force, the war would culminate in a brutal 21st-century battle for the megacity of Taipei, with outcomes that would reshape Asia and the world.
