As the strategic competition between the United States and China grows increasingly volatile, India finds itself at a critical geopolitical crossroads. The recent strain in India-US relations has sparked debates about potentially tilting toward China, but a closer examination reveals this to be an untenable approach that demands a more sophisticated strategy.
The Flawed Logic of Tilting Toward China
Following the shocking turn in India-US relations this year, some voices have advocated for a strategic pivot toward China as a counterbalance to American influence. However, this approach faces at least three fundamental problems that make it impractical for India's long-term interests.
First, the United States possesses what India genuinely needs for its development and shows willingness to trade, even if with protective tariffs. China, in contrast, appears primarily focused on exporting finished goods rather than engaging in meaningful two-way trade that would support India's manufacturing and technological advancement.
Second, Beijing would only accept India's tilt on its own imperious Middle Kingdom terms, essentially requiring New Delhi to subordinate its interests to Chinese strategic objectives. Third, and most critically, India's unresolved direct and indirect boundary disputes with China create a hard limit on how close the relationship can realistically become.
Limited Options with Other Power Centers
If not China, what about other global power centers? India's engagement with Western Europe remains constrained by the Russia factor, which will continue to limit ties with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom even after the Russia-Ukraine conflict concludes.
Relationships in West Asia are circumscribed by the complex dynamics of Israel-Palestine and Israel-Arab-Iran tensions. To the East, India's own security considerations restrict how far it can advance with the Quad, while economic constraints maintain distance from Southeast Asian neighbors.
Other options like BRICS essentially function as an anti-American showboat that India cannot fully embrace, while the concept of the 'Global South' often serves as a Western-coined collective noun rather than a coherent strategic framework.
A New Strategic Framework for India
Given these constraints, India requires a fresh strategic approach that conservatively carries forward core conceptions of national interest while creatively navigating emerging global realities. This strategy must align with India's political culture and be implementable by its governmental machinery to have any chance of success.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has outlined India's primary goal: to become a developed nation by 2047. This objective requires sustained high economic growth, with peace, harmony, and environmental sustainability as key national policy objectives. The role of foreign and defense policy is to create a conducive environment for achieving these goals.
Despite challenges from the Donald Trump administration, New Delhi must find ways to strengthen its relationship with the United States. There is potential that in its second year, the Trump administration may develop a better understanding of its early policy decisions' consequences and could be positioned to close a bilateral trade agreement.
Simultaneously, India must repair ties with China while recognizing that power constitutes the fundamental language of this relationship. New Delhi should not yield on border questions nor treat China as a normal trade partner. This doesn't mean cutting off relations entirely—rather, India should explore trade, economics, technology, territory, and global issues on separate tracks, cooperating where possible and confronting China where necessary.
The Path Forward: Sectoral Plurilateralism
To manage the vagaries of the volatile US-China relationship, which could shift between G2 cooperation and Cold War confrontation within months, India needs a systematic approach to engaging with the world.
Indian foreign policy should creatively shift toward purposeful sectoral plurilateralism. To create backstops and leverage against pressure from either the US or China, New Delhi should invest in constellations of plurilateral groups centered around specific sectors and comprising countries sharing similar geopolitical concerns.
The most effective plurilaterals are those requiring India's participation for viability. The recently concluded India-Australia-Canada partnership on technology and innovation exemplifies this approach. Multiple sectors—including defense, energy, biotech, space, higher education, public health, food security, and environment—offer opportunities for India to bring together like-minded countries to achieve meaningful outcomes.
Over time, some of these overlapping relationships could evolve into substantial plurilateral blocs, much like the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951 eventually grew into the European Union decades later.
This incremental approach represents a positive development for Indian foreign policy. Instead of pursuing flashy new doctrines, New Delhi's foreign policy establishment should restructure its relationship portfolio toward the coherent purpose of creating meaningful leverage with partners across multiple sectors and regions.
The author, Nitin Pai, is co-founder and director of The Takshashila Institution, an independent centre for research and education in public policy.
