The High Court of Delhi has ruled that criminal proceedings quashed based on a settlement and marriage between the parties cannot be revived later merely because the matrimonial relationship subsequently breaks down or allegations of cruelty emerge. The Court emphasized that if every matrimonial dispute arising after the quashing of an FIR were allowed to reopen concluded criminal proceedings, no settlement-based quashing order would ever achieve finality.
Background of the Case
Justice Amit Mahajan dismissed an application filed by a woman seeking recall of an earlier order through which an FIR registered under Sections 376(2)(n), 313, and 506 IPC against her husband had been quashed after the parties solemnized marriage. The case is titled Ashwini Pal v. State NCT of Delhi & Anr.
The Court held that subsequent matrimonial discord, claims of cruelty, assault, or abandonment, even if assumed to be correct, would not by themselves establish that the earlier quashing order had been obtained by fraud.
Details of the FIR
The FIR was originally registered on May 29, 2024, at Police Station Laxmi Nagar based on the woman's complaint. According to her claims, the parties were in a live-in relationship during which the accused established physical relations on the assurance of marriage. She further claimed that he terminated her pregnancy against her will by administering abortion pills and later refused to marry her. However, the parties solemnized marriage on May 31, 2024, according to Hindu rites and ceremonies, after the registration of the FIR.
The husband then approached the Delhi High Court to quash the FIR and all related proceedings, arguing that the disputes had been amicably resolved.
Earlier Quashing Order
On December 3, 2024, the High Court quashed the FIR after recording statements from both parties. The earlier order noted that the woman appeared personally and stated that she had been in a consensual relationship with the accused and that the complaint was lodged due to misunderstandings after he initially refused to marry her. She further stated that the parties had subsequently married, were living together peacefully, and she no longer wished to pursue the criminal proceedings. The quashing petition was supported by her sworn affidavit, in which she expressly stated no objection to the quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings.
While quashing the proceedings, the Court referred to Supreme Court decisions in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra regarding the quashing of proceedings for non-compoundable offences. Although the offences included Sections 376(2)(n) and 313 IPC, the Court exercised powers under Section 528 BNSS after noting the consensual nature of the relationship, the subsequent marriage, and the prosecutrix's statement that she no longer wished to pursue the matter.
Woman's Application for Recall
About six months after the FIR was quashed, the woman moved the present application seeking recall of the order. She argued that the quashing order had been obtained by fraud, coercion, and misrepresentation. She claimed that she agreed to the quashing only because the husband and his family assured her that the marriage would be honored sincerely and she would be given a dignified matrimonial life. However, soon after the FIR was quashed, she was subjected to physical violence, emotional abuse, threats, and financial exploitation. She further claimed that she was abandoned by her husband on April 6, 2025, and later assaulted, resulting in hospitalization.
The woman also relied on complaints made to the National Commission for Women, medical records, and alleged audio recordings. She argued that the marriage was merely a device adopted by the accused to evade criminal prosecution.
Husband's Opposition
Counsel for the husband opposed the application, contending that the High Court had become functus officio after passing the final quashing order and could not reopen or review the matter due to the bar under Section 362 CrPC/Section 403 BNSS. Citing Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, they argued that inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS cannot be invoked for review or alteration of a final judgment.
It was further argued that once the parties admittedly solemnized marriage, the allegation that consent had been obtained on a false promise to marry lost all legal force. The husband also contended that the allegations now raised related entirely to events after the FIR was quashed, giving rise to independent causes of action for which separate remedies were available. He disputed the correctness and admissibility of the alleged electronic evidence and leveled counter-allegations that the woman had subjected him to violence, threats, and harassment after marriage.
High Court's Examination of Recall Power
The High Court examined the legal framework governing review or recall of criminal orders. Referring to Section 362 CrPC and recent precedents, the Court reiterated that once a criminal court signs its final order disposing of a matter, it becomes functus officio and cannot review or alter the same except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors. The Court emphasized that inherent powers cannot be exercised in a manner that defeats the statutory prohibition against review.
Justice Amit Mahajan observed that criminal courts do not possess substantive review jurisdiction analogous to civil courts. The Court then examined whether the present case disclosed any fraud practiced upon the Court while obtaining the earlier quashing order.
No Fraud Established
Answering in the negative, the Court noted that the FIR had not been quashed merely on the basis of a future assurance of matrimonial harmony. Instead, the earlier order was based on several contemporaneous circumstances, including the woman's personal appearance before the Court, her categorical statement that the relationship was consensual, her acknowledgment that the complaint arose after the accused refused to marry her, the admitted fact that the parties had subsequently married, and her sworn affidavit expressly supporting quashing of the criminal proceedings.
The Court emphasized that the earlier Bench had not mechanically quashed the FIR merely because the parties married, but had independently examined whether the case was fit for exercise of powers under Section 528 BNSS despite the serious nature of allegations under Sections 376 and 313 IPC.
Distinction Between False Promise and Subsequent Breakdown
The judgment discussed the settled distinction between a false promise to marry made in bad faith and a mere subsequent failure of the relationship. Relying on Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, the Court reiterated that every breach of promise to marry does not automatically amount to rape. For an offence under Section 376 IPC to be attracted on the basis of a false promise to marry, it must prima facie appear that the promise itself was false from inception and made without any intention of being honoured. A subsequent breakdown of the relationship, reluctance to continue the marriage, or failure of the matrimonial relationship by itself cannot convert an otherwise consensual relationship into rape.
The Court further noted that the marriage had been solemnized on May 31, 2024, while the FIR was quashed much later on December 3, 2024. Therefore, the marriage was not created immediately before the quashing order merely as a temporary arrangement.
Finality of Settlement-Based Quashing
The High Court observed that the allegations now raised by both parties essentially reflected a subsequent deterioration of matrimonial harmony. The Court specifically refused to adjudicate upon the truthfulness of the rival allegations regarding post-marriage conduct. Justice Mahajan observed that even commission of fresh offences after quashing would not automatically establish that the earlier settlement or judicial order stood vitiated by fraud from inception. The Court warned that permitting such recall applications based on subsequent matrimonial disputes would destroy the finality underlying settlement-based quashing jurisdiction.
The judgment stated: “If every subsequent matrimonial disagreement, breakdown of marriage, or allegation arising after quashing were permitted to revive concluded criminal proceedings, no order passed on the basis of settlement or reconciliation would ever attain finality.”
At the same time, the Court clarified that the woman remained free to pursue remedies available under law regarding any subsequent acts of alleged cruelty, assault, intimidation, or domestic violence.
Conclusion
Holding that the allegations raised by the applicant related essentially to subsequent matrimonial discord and did not prima facie establish that the earlier quashing order had been procured by fraud, coercion, or misrepresentation, the Delhi High Court dismissed the recall application and refused to revive the FIR previously quashed under Sections 376(2)(n), 313, and 506 IPC.
Case Details: CRL.M.C. 5219/2024, Ashwini Pal v. State NCT of Delhi and Anr.
For the Applicant: Mr. Nandan Kumar Rai & Mr. Gajendra Mohan Thakur, Advocates.
For the Respondent: SI Prashant Malik, PS Laxmi Nagar.
This article is authored by Vatsal Chandra, a Delhi-based Advocate practicing before the courts of Delhi NCR.
