Supreme Court Upholds Speaker's Authority in Judge Removal Case
The Supreme Court firmly rejected a plea from Allahabad High Court judge Yashwant Varma. The judge had challenged the Lok Sabha Speaker's decision to appoint a committee regarding a motion for his removal. The court made it clear that constitutional protections for judges should not bring the removal process to a complete standstill.
Court Finds No Illegality in Speaker's Actions
A bench comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma delivered the ruling. They stated the Speaker committed no illegality in forming the committee. The court also addressed the handling of a related notice in the Rajya Sabha.
While the court acknowledged the Rajya Sabha deputy chairman had the authority to refuse admission of a notice of motion, it noted the processing at the secretariat level did not fully comply with the law's intended procedures. However, the bench chose not to examine the validity of the deputy chairman's specific order, as Justice Varma had not challenged it directly. The court concluded this point would have no practical effect on the case.
Background of the Parliamentary Notices
The case stems from events on July 25 last year. Over 100 Lok Sabha members signed a notice for a motion to remove Justice Varma. The Speaker received this notice around 12:30 PM, but it was not admitted that same day.
Later that afternoon, between 4:07 PM and 4:19 PM, a separate notice signed by more than 50 members was presented in the Rajya Sabha. This situation invoked the first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, which deals with notices given in both Houses on the same day.
The Rajya Sabha chairman initially directed the secretary general to take necessary steps. However, the chairman resigned from the office of Vice-President of India later that very day, adding complexity to the proceedings.
Legal Arguments Presented in Court
Senior advocate Mukul Rohatgi, representing Justice Varma, argued a key point. He contended that when notices of motion are given on the same day in both Houses, a Judicial Inquiry Committee (JIC) cannot be formed unless both Houses have actually admitted the motions. Rohatgi emphasized that the JIC must be constituted jointly by the Speaker and the chairman.
Solicitor General Tushar Mehta countered this argument for the government. He asserted that Section 3(2) of the Act applies only when motions are admitted in both Houses, not merely when they are given or presented.
Court's Reasoning and Interpretation of the Law
The Supreme Court bench firmly rejected Varma's plea. It stated the provision does not envision a scenario where a notice is accepted in one House but rejected in the other.
"To interpret the said proviso in the manner suggested by Rohatgi would require us to read into it a disabling consequence," the bench observed. "Such an interpretation would amount to judicial legislation, a course we are neither empowered nor inclined to undertake."
The court found no basis in the Judges (Inquiry) Act to suggest that rejecting a motion in one House makes the other House incompetent to proceed legally. "The argument, therefore, lacks any legal foundation," the bench stated.
The judges warned that accepting the petitioner's interpretation would have serious consequences. It would force members to start the entire process from scratch in either House if one House rejected a notice. "Had Parliament intended such far-reaching consequences, it would have articulated the first proviso in clear and unambiguous terms. The absence of any express provision to that effect is, in our opinion, determinative," the court said.
Protecting Parliamentary Autonomy
The bench highlighted that accepting Varma's argument would lead to absurd outcomes. The individual capacity of one House to initiate a removal motion under Article 124(4) of the Constitution would become dependent on the outcome in the other House, even at the initial admission stage.
The court strongly asserted that removing the autonomy of one House of Parliament could not have been the intent behind the first proviso. The proviso applies specifically only when notices given on the same day have been admitted by both Houses. It does not restrict or negate the individual authority of either House.
"The first proviso must, therefore, be construed to balance prescribed protection with the effective functioning of the mechanism for removal of a judge from office triggered by the peoples’ representatives, and not to frustrate it altogether," the Supreme Court concluded, reinforcing the principle that constitutional safeguards must not paralyze essential democratic processes.
