In a landmark interpretation, the Supreme Court of India has significantly broadened the legal understanding of what constitutes a terrorist act under the stringent Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). On Monday, the apex court ruled that terrorism is not confined to the use of conventional weapons like guns or bombs but extends to acts that threaten national integrity and sovereignty, including those that disrupt the supply of essential commodities through agitation or protest.
Bail Pleas Rejected, Definition Expanded
The ruling came as a bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and N V Anjaria rejected the bail pleas of student activists Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam. The activists had argued that their alleged acts—making inflammatory speeches and calling for a 'Chakka Jam' (road blockade)—constituted, at worst, a public order issue and not a terror act under UAPA, as they involved no firearms or explosives.
The court, however, firmly disagreed. Elaborating on Section 15 of UAPA, which defines a terrorist act, the bench emphasized that the law explicitly uses the phrase "by any other means of whatever nature." The judges stated that this phrase cannot be ignored or rendered meaningless. "The means by which such acts may be committed are not confined to the use of bombs, explosives, firearms, or other conventional weapons alone," the bench clarified.
Intent and Effect Over Instrumentality
The Supreme Court underscored that the focus of the anti-terror law is on the design, intent, and effect of an act, not merely the instrument used. "To construe Section 15 as limited only to conventional modes of violence would be to unduly narrow the provision, contrary to its plain language," the judgment read.
This interpretation brings actions that attack economic security and disrupt supplies of essential commodities squarely within the ambit of terrorism. The court noted this was a direct reference to the allegations against Khalid and Imam, who were accused of calling for paralyzing city traffic and cutting off the Northeast region, respectively.
"Apart from death or destruction of property, the provision expressly encompasses acts which disrupt supplies or services essential to the life of the community, as well as acts which threaten the economic security of the nation," the bench observed. It added that Parliament recognized threats to sovereignty could arise from conduct that destabilizes civic life, even without immediate physical violence.
Legal Arguments and the Court's Final Word
The defense had contended that the Delhi Police's allegations, at their highest, only disclosed a public order situation and that invoking UAPA represented an overstretched understanding of terrorism. They argued the activists could, at most, be charged with conspiracy under Section 18 of UAPA.
Opposing this, the Delhi Police, represented by Solicitor General Tushar Mehta and Additional Solicitor General S V Raju, successfully argued that the statutory definition was never meant to be confined to conventional violence.
The Supreme Court, in its conclusive analysis, linked Sections 15 and 18. It explained that while Section 15 defines the terrorist act, Section 18 ensures liability extends not just to execution but also to planning, coordination, and mobilization. "Whether particular conduct ultimately attracts Section 15 directly, or Section 18 read with Section 15, depends upon the role attributed and the statutory ingredients alleged to be satisfied," the bench stated, upholding the broader legislative design to combat terrorism in all its forms.
