Congress's Tamil Nadu Dilemma: To Stay or Go?
The Congress party in Tamil Nadu finds itself at a crossroads. The question is no longer about being an equal partner with the DMK. Instead, it is about whether Congress can afford to stop being a junior ally at all. Recent reports suggest the party's high command has silenced any talk of exiting the DMK-led front. The reasoning is straightforward and practical.
Tamil Nadu remains one of the few states where Congress still turns alliances into electoral victories. A break with the DMK would damage both the 2026 Assembly election calculations and the party's prospects for the 2029 general elections. This dependence is not new. It has deep historical roots that shape today's political landscape.
A Historical Partnership Takes Shape
The Congress-DMK relationship began to change significantly after 1954. That year, C Rajagopalachari resigned as Tamil Nadu chief minister following backlash against the Modified Scheme of Elementary Education. The DMK had criticized this policy as "kula kalvi" or caste-based education.
K Kamaraj, who became the new chief minister, worked to broaden the Congress base. He fielded candidates aligned with the Dravidar Kazhagam movement. This helped make Congress more socially and linguistically acceptable in an increasingly anti-Brahminical public sphere.
Several developments strengthened the DMK's position over time. The Sixteenth Constitutional Amendment's anti-secession provisions pushed the DMK to emphasize federalism more strongly. Meanwhile, the split within the Congress party weakened its Tamil Nadu unit as the DMK consolidated power.
The relationship crystallized in 1971 with a pact between Indira Gandhi and the DMK. This agreement established a clear division: the DMK would maintain dominance in state assemblies, while Congress (I) would receive priority in parliamentary elections.
The Rise of Dravidian Bipolar Politics
The political landscape shifted again with the emergence of MG Ramachandran and the AIADMK. This development made Congress's position more challenging. The party's traditional social bases, particularly in western and southern Tamil Nadu, gradually became absorbed into the new Dravidian two-party system.
Tamil Nadu continued to produce nationally prominent Congress leaders. However, the state unit increasingly lacked a durable organizational structure. Internal divisions and factional conflicts further weakened the party.
The 1996 breakaway led by G K Moopanar proved particularly damaging. This split created the Tamil Maanila Congress and left the original party thinner in cadre depth and internal cohesion.
The Current Electoral Arithmetic
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, a stable pattern had emerged despite ongoing turbulence. In Assembly elections, Congress accepted a smaller footprint. In Lok Sabha elections, it bargained for a better share of seats.
The DMK often found it useful to accommodate Congress in parliamentary contests. This served as a marker of opposition unity, even while keeping state-level power concentrated within the Dravidian two-pole system. This approach differs from regional parties in other states that typically convert state strength into larger Lok Sabha shares.
This arrangement has repeatedly benefited Congress. In the 2019 general elections, the DMK-led alliance swept Tamil Nadu. Congress won nine of the ten seats it contested. This success reflected not a Congress resurgence but the coalition's ability to transfer winnability to its partners.
Present Tensions and Future Prospects
Current tensions between Chennai and Delhi revolve around this very arithmetic. Some MPs and aspirants want a harder bargain, including ministerial positions. However, state leadership warns that brinkmanship risks the only formula that has proven effective.
The numbers support this caution. In the 2021 Assembly elections, Congress contested just 25 seats and won 18. In these conditions, threatening to walk away appears less like a bargaining chip and more like an admission of weakness.
Rahul Gandhi's strong positions on social justice and federalism further tighten the DMK-Congress fit. His attempt to project an alternative vision at the national level aligns well with DMK priorities, despite occasional factional disagreements.
Political Culture Constraints
A significant constraint comes from Tamil Nadu's political culture. Drawing from CN Annadurai's legacy, Dravidian parties have long preferred to maintain control over state government. This convention limits Congress's ability to convert alliance membership into visible executive power.
This explains why demands for ministerial berths and a "bigger say" keep resurfacing. Congress wants organizational regeneration, but Tamil Nadu's coalition grammar does not easily accommodate shared governance.
The Path Forward
Congress could certainly attempt to rebuild independently in Tamil Nadu. However, this would require years of dedicated work: strengthening cadre, organizing local bodies, and cultivating new leadership. Until such groundwork produces results, exiting the DMK alliance would represent less a declaration of autonomy than an act of self-sabotage.
Such a move would weaken the broader opposition ecology in Tamil Nadu. Anti-BJP consolidation in the state depends on a recognizable secular platform anchored by the DMK. Congress benefits from being part of this coalition.
The more realistic lesson for Congress is learning to be led in key states. The party must act as a sutradhar that prioritizes winnable and coherent coalitions rather than imposing top-down templates. In Tamil Nadu, this means accepting the junior partner role while working to maximize benefits within that framework.
The alliance continues because both parties recognize its mutual advantages. For Congress, it provides electoral relevance in a crucial state. For the DMK, it strengthens opposition unity at the national level. This delicate balance will likely continue shaping Tamil Nadu politics for the foreseeable future.
