The Delhi High Court has held that the statutory one-year waiting period prescribed under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 can be waived in exceptional circumstances, particularly where the marriage has never commenced in substance and continuation of the legal relationship would only prolong the parties' mental and social hardship.
The Court observed that where there has been no cohabitation, no consummation, no social acceptance of the marriage and both spouses are ad idem on seeking dissolution, insistence on the statutory waiting period would serve no meaningful purpose and would instead defeat the object of the law.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Renu Bhatnagar allowed an appeal filed by Shahbaz Khan and set aside a Family Court order which had refused to waive the statutory period under Sections 28 and 29 of the Special Marriage Act.
Marriage Never Commenced in Substance
The appellant and respondent belonged to different faiths and had solemnized and registered their marriage under the Special Marriage Act on 25.08.2025 in Delhi.
According to the case placed before the Court, difficulties arose immediately after the marriage was disclosed to the appellant's family. The appellant stated that his father collapsed from shock upon learning about the marriage and was subsequently diagnosed with liver failure. It was further stated that the appellant's family severed all ties with him following the marriage.
The respondent was also intimidated by the possibility that her family might do the same, and decided not to tell her family about the marriage. As a result, her family remained unaware of the marriage even at the time of the proceedings.
The parties asserted that because of these circumstances, the marriage never progressed beyond its formal registration. There was no cohabitation, no consummation of marriage and no social or familial acceptance from either side. Both parties agreed that the relationship had become unworkable from the very beginning.
In view of the situation, the parties approached the Family Court seeking divorce by mutual consent.
They also requested a waiver of two statutory deadlines provided by the Special Marriage Act, namely, the one-year period after solemnization of marriage until which divorce petition can be filed in the court and the six-month cooling-off period for filing divorce petition in the court in case of mutual consent divorce proceedings.
However, the Family Court dismissed the application.
The Family Court was of the view that the case did not disclose "exceptional hardship" warranting exercise of discretion under Section 29 of the Special Marriage Act. It also observed that the parties had not made sufficient efforts towards cohabitation or saving the marriage. As a result, the petition itself was rejected as not maintainable.
Aggrieved by the decision, the husband approached the Delhi High Court.
Counsel appearing for the appellant argued that the Family Court had failed to exercise the discretion vested in it under Section 29 of the Special Marriage Act. It was argued that the Family Court had adopted a hyper-technical approach by faulting the parties for not attempting to save a marriage that had never truly commenced. According to the appellant, the admitted facts demonstrated that there had never been any cohabitation, consummation or functional marital relationship between the parties.
The appellant further argued that the Family Court had ignored the severe social, psychological and familial consequences flowing from the marriage and had wrongly concluded that no exceptional hardship existed. The appellant placed reliance on the Supreme Court's decisions in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur and Amit Kumar v. Suman Beniwal, where statutory waiting periods were recognized as directory and capable of being waived where continuation of the marriage served no practical purpose.
High Court Examines Scheme of Special Marriage Act
The High Court noted that Section 29 of the Special Marriage Act places a restriction on presentation of divorce petitions within one year of marriage but simultaneously grants courts discretionary power to permit such petitions in cases involving exceptional hardship to the petitioner or exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent.
The Court finds that the intent of the provision is to generally give a marriage some stability, but allow for the court's discretion in rare and compelling cases.
The Bench also examined Section 28 of the Act, which incorporates the concept of a cooling-off period in cases of divorce by mutual consent. The Court observed that the purpose of such a period is restorative rather than procedural, as it gives parties an opportunity to reconsider and possibly reconcile their relationship.
The Court further observed that conjoint reading of the provisions, demonstrates a legislative intent to protect the institution of marriage while simultaneously empowering courts to grant relief in deserving cases based on their peculiar facts and circumstances.
Relies on Full Bench Decision in Shiksha Kumari
A significant aspect of the judgment was the Court's reliance on the Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Shiksha Kumari v. Santosh Kumar.
The Bench noted that the Full Bench had recently held that the one-year period prescribed under Section 13B (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act could be waived by applying the proviso to Section 14(1) of that Act. The Full Bench had further clarified that waiver of the one-year period and waiver of the six-month cooling-off period are independent considerations and can be examined separately by courts.
Since Sections 28 and 29 of the Special Marriage Act are pari materia with Sections 13B and 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Court held that the same principles would apply while interpreting the Special Marriage Act.
Court Finds Exceptional Hardship Established
Applying those principles, the Division Bench found that the present case clearly disclosed exceptional hardship within the meaning of Section 29 of the Special Marriage Act.
The Court observed that it was an admitted position that the marriage was purely notional in nature. The parties never lived together, the marriage was never consummated and there was no social or familial recognition of the relationship. There was also no child born from the marriage.
The Court further noted the severe consequences suffered by the appellant after disclosure of the marriage, including estrangement from his family and the serious medical condition of his father. It also took note of the respondent's apprehension that disclosure of the marriage to her own family could result in similar consequences and possible disownment.
The Bench held: “The circumstances, as stated by the parties, namely, the severe familial estrangement faced by the appellant, the serious medical condition of his father and the respondent’s apprehension of similar consequences clearly constitutes ‘exceptional hardship’ within the meaning of Section 29 of the Act.”
The Court found that both parties were in complete agreement regarding dissolution of the marriage and there existed no realistic possibility of reconciliation. According to the Court, insisting upon compliance with the statutory period in such circumstances would only prolong the hardship already being suffered by the parties.
The Bench observed: “Insisting upon adherence to the statutory period of one year would serve no meaningful purpose. On the contrary, it would only result in prolongation of hardship.”
The Court also held that the Family Court had adopted an unduly restrictive interpretation of the statutory framework and had failed to exercise its discretion in the manner contemplated by law.
The Division Bench concluded that the continuation of the marriage would only prolong the parties' agony arising from unavoidable mental and social distress and therefore warranted exercise of judicial discretion.
The appeal was accordingly allowed and the Family Court's judgment was set aside. The High Court permitted waiver of the statutory one-year period under Section 29 of the Special Marriage Act and directed that the mutual consent divorce petition be entertained without insisting on completion of one year from the date of marriage. The matter was remanded to the Family Court with directions to proceed expeditiously with the first motion petition under Section 28(1) of the Act. The Court further expressed hope that upon filing of the second motion petition, the Family Court would also decide the same expeditiously in light of the principles laid down in Shiksha Kumari, Amardeep Singh and Amit Kumar.
MAT.APP.(F.C.) 60/2026 & CM APPL. 11752/2026
SHAHBAZ KHAN vs KOMAL SHRESTH
Date of Decision: 29.05.2026
For petitioner: Ms. Khalida Akhtar, Mr. Abdullah Akhtar and Mr. Maaz Akhtar, Advs.
For Respondent: Mr. Shadaan, Advocate along with respondent
