US Missile Production Faces Hidden Crisis in Rocket Motor Supply Chain
Conflicts from Venezuela to West Asia are driving a sharp increase in American demand for missiles and munitions. Behind this surge, a less visible but critical bottleneck is emerging deep within the US defense supply chain. The problem is not a lack of missile designs or major contractors. Instead, a growing shortage of solid rocket motors and the specialized materials needed to make them is creating serious challenges.
Why Solid Rocket Motors Matter
Solid rocket motors power many of the US military's most important weapons. These include the Army's Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System and the Navy's Standard Missile family. Demand for these systems has surged in recent years. Washington is replenishing stocks drawn down by support for allies and preparing for potential high-intensity conflicts.
This surge has encouraged new players to enter the market. It has also pushed established manufacturers to expand their operations. However, senior industry executives report a significant mismatch. Growth at the top levels of production has not been matched by growth in the lower tiers of the supply chain. Many critical parts and chemicals are produced by just one or two suppliers.
"We don't really need a third solid rocket motor provider," said L3Harris CEO Chris Kubasik in September. "We need more companies that make nozzles. We need more companies that make igniters. We need more companies that make cases."
Small Suppliers Under Pressure
One clear example is Helicon Chemical Company. This small Orlando-based firm is trying to become a second supplier for HTPB-45M, a binding agent used in most solid rocket motors. Helicon planned to set up production in West Virginia with backing from a $15 million Pentagon contract. That funding has now stalled due to budget uncertainty.
"The situation is aggravated by the ongoing lapse in the Small Business Innovation Research program," Helicon CEO Jack Sarnicki told reporters. He added that another government shutdown could be devastating for his company.
"Everything has come to a screeching halt," Sarnicki explained. "If we don't get under contract and another government shutdown occurs, we could have real issues. We would probably have to think about laying off people."
Even if funding resumes, Helicon estimates it would take eighteen months to two years to qualify production. Every delay directly extends the timeline before a second supplier becomes available.
A Shrinking Industrial Base
According to defense analytics firm Govini, the US industrial base for solid rocket motors has dramatically narrowed over the past three decades. Between 1995 and 2017, the number of US providers fell from six to just two. These are Orbital ATK, now part of Northrop Grumman, and Aerojet Rocketdyne, acquired by L3Harris in 2023. A third producer, Norway-based Nammo, manufactures some motors overseas.
While startups such as Anduril, Ursa Major, and X-Bow are trying to expand capacity, Govini warns that many critical inputs remain single-source or have long lead times.
"The Department leadership has a real opportunity right now," Govini CEO Tara Murphy Dougherty said. "But as of right now, they're going to do things the exact same way and somehow expect different results from a supply chain management perspective."
The Ripple Effect Risk
One of the biggest vulnerabilities lies in energetics, the chemicals that enable propulsion. Govini notes that American Pacific Corporation is the only US-based producer of ammonium perchlorate, a key propellant ingredient. This creates what the firm calls a "single point of failure."
Nammo encountered a similar risk in 2025 when a chemical supplier for one of its propellants went out of business without an alternative source. Andy Davis, Nammo's vice president of engineering and strategy, explained why such disruptions are hard to fix quickly.
"One of the challenges you have that people don't understand is a propellant formulation is made up of, say, 10 to 12 ingredients," Davis said. "So if you take, say, aluminum powder, and you've qualified a formulation with one aluminum powder and that manufacturer no longer supplies that aluminum, it's not as simple as 'I'm just going to go get another aluminum powder and put it in.'"
Replacing a single ingredient can force companies to requalify the propellant, the rocket motor, and sometimes the entire missile. This process can take years.
The risks are not theoretical. In October, an explosion at Accurate Energetic Systems in Tennessee killed sixteen people. It destroyed a facility that Govini identified as a sub-tier supplier to Aerojet Rocketdyne, Northrop, and Nammo.
"This should be a wake up call," Murphy Dougherty said. "There's just a lack of redundancy for a lot of these components and parts in critical systems like solid rocket motors."
How Companies Are Responding
To work around bottlenecks, companies are adopting different strategies. Anduril is pushing suppliers to expand into adjacent components. In some cases, it is teaching them new manufacturing techniques.
"We've fired motors with that case," said Bret Perry, Anduril's head of growth for rocket motor systems. He was referring to a supplier the company helped transition into making motor cases.
Ursa Major is betting on vertical integration, producing more components in-house. "We're actually buying powder and sintering it ourselves," said Bill Murray, the company's vice president of product and engineering.
Large prime contractors are also investing heavily. L3Harris has spent more than $250 million on long-lead materials and supplier upgrades. Northrop Grumman says it has invested over $1 billion across its solid rocket motor facilities. It plans to double output over the next four years.
Pentagon Funding and Lingering Gaps
Congress has allocated billions of dollars to shore up the solid rocket motor industrial base. This includes hundreds of millions specifically for second-source suppliers. The Pentagon has awarded contracts to expand nozzle and motor case production. It has also funded prototypes for new manufacturing techniques.
Yet for small suppliers like Helicon, the gap between policy intent and on-the-ground reality remains wide.
"We're a small company way down the food chain," Sarnicki said. "You'll read the articles that Raytheon gets a huge contract, or Northrop gets it. Everything seems great. But you have to be able to produce it."
As the United States accelerates missile production amid global instability, the success of that effort may hinge less on headline contracts. It may depend more on whether the Pentagon can stabilize and diversify the vulnerable supply chains that sit far from public view.
