Jamshid Ghomi, a dual US-Iranian national and CEO of an Iran-based technology company, was arrested today on a federal criminal complaint. According to a press release from the U.S. Attorney's Office, Central District of California, Ghomi is accused of violating US sanctions against Iran by shipping sophisticated US-origin networking, security, and encryption equipment to Iranian customers, including the Iranian regime's nuclear and military establishment.
Ghomi, 33, a resident of Newport Coast, California, has been charged with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). First Assistant United States Attorney Bill Essayli stated: "Ghomi is accused of aiding our declared enemies by selling U.S.-origin computer networking parts to Iran and earning millions of dollars in violation of U.S. sanction laws. Our nation's laws prohibiting doing business with one of the world's largest state sponsors of terrorism must be enforced and obeyed. We will hold him accountable by seeking an appropriate prison sentence and by seizing his assets, including his $35 million Newport Beach mansion."
Allegations and Modus Operandi
According to the affidavit filed with the complaint, Ghomi is the founder, owner, and CEO of Faraz Pardaz Rayaneh Co. Ltd. (FPR), a Tehran-based computer networking company. For over a decade, Ghomi used FPR to procure U.S.-origin networking equipment for customers in Iran in violation of U.S. sanctions. He never obtained a license from the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for these transactions.
From 2011 to 2023, Ghomi used his eBay and PayPal accounts to make hundreds of purchases of computer-networking equipment, directing the goods to intermediaries in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In 2023, he personally negotiated the purchase of U.S.-origin networking equipment from suppliers in Minnesota and Nebraska, routing it through a UAE front company to FPR in Iran. None of these items could be lawfully exported to Iran without an OFAC license.
From 2014 to 2018, Ghomi arranged the smuggling of more than 250 metric tons (275.6 U.S. tons) of networking equipment into Iran, using freight forwarders and intermediaries in Dubai to disguise the true destination. He directed UAE co-conspirators to keep his name off shipping paperwork, omit invoices from shipments bound for Iran, and hide U.S.-origin computer equipment inside larger shipments on at least two occasions. He used front companies in the UAE to obscure his role and personally received warnings on invoices and software licenses that exporting these goods to Iran was prohibited. Ghomi and his co-conspirators referred to Iran as "Motherland" in their internal correspondence.
Clientele and Sensitive End-Users
FPR's annual sales exceeded $10 million, and its clientele included hundreds of Iranian companies and government entities, many subject to U.S. sanctions. A significant portion of that business went to the most sensitive end-users in Iran: the Iranian regime's nuclear and military establishment.
From 2017 to 2023, FPR supplied U.S.-origin computer networking equipment to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the government agency responsible for Iran's nuclear program, including centrifuge and uranium-enrichment programs. The U.S. State Department sanctioned AEOI in 2020 for Iran's nonperformance of nuclear commitments. AEOI required FPR to register as an approved vendor, which it did in 2021 and 2022. From 2014 to 2022, FPR supplied U.S.-origin networking, security, and encryption equipment to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics and affiliated military and defense-electronics entities. FPR's 2017 contract with Iran Computer Industries, signed by Ghomi, expressly identified the buyer as the "Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics — Iran Computer Industries."
Money Laundering and Tax Evasion
Ghomi laundered the proceeds of his illegal business into the United States. He deposited FPR's Iranian sales revenue into its operating account at a sanctioned Iranian bank and then swept those funds to himself. Within days, he received matching wires into his U.S. accounts from a rotating set of trading companies and exchange houses in the British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, Turkey, and the UAE, with false descriptions such as "Buying Goods" and "For Consulting Fees."
From 2011 to 2024, Ghomi moved more than $15 million from Iran into his U.S. bank accounts and into a construction escrow account. He falsely reported those funds to the IRS as a foreign inheritance. His federal tax returns reported almost no income, with the highest being $20,684 in any year. Ghomi claimed the Earned Income Tax Credit in seven different tax years while reporting over $1.7 million in home-mortgage interest and $1.25 million in state and local real-estate taxes.
Ghomi funded the construction of his Orange County mansion with the proceeds of his sanctions-evasion scheme. He purchased a vacant lot in Newport Coast in March 2010 for $4,490,000 and paid approximately $10,490,371 to construct the residence from 2010 to 2013. From May 2011 to August 2015, foreign-source wires totaling more than $7 million flowed into the escrow account funding the home's construction, originating from the same trading companies as the transfers from FPR's operating account.
Legal Framework and Potential Penalties
The IEEPA and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) impose controls on transactions involving Iran due to threats posed to U.S. national security, including Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and sponsorship of terrorism. These regulations prohibit the export, re-export, sale, or supply of any goods, technology, or services to Iran or the Government of Iran without OFAC authorization.
If convicted, Ghomi faces a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years in federal prison. IRS Criminal Investigation, in coordination with the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security, is investigating this matter.
