India hosted the 16th BRICS National Security Advisers' Meeting in New Delhi on June 22-23, 2026, chaired by NSA Ajit Doval, bringing together all 11 member nations. The meeting focused on non-traditional security challenges including terrorism, cyber threats, and emerging technologies. No joint statement was issued, reflecting sharp divergences among members on macro-security issues.
BRICS Evolution and India's Diplomatic Acumen
The grouping, formed in June 2009 in Yekaterinburg, Russia, as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), added South Africa in 2011. Current full members are Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates. China was represented by Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The fact that Delhi convened this meeting amid two wars (Ukraine and Iran) and ensured participation of regional rivals testifies to India's deft diplomatic acumen. This was a preparatory meeting for the BRICS summit to be held in India in September.
Three Tangible Outcomes
First, the NSAs agreed that the most urgent security challenges are non-traditional, including terrorism enabled by emerging technologies, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, weaponisation of supply chains, food, fertiliser and energy insecurity, and climate-induced instability. They reviewed the work of BRICS Joint Working Groups on Counter-Terrorism and ICT security. For Delhi, chairing BRICS in 2026 shifts it from a China-centric economic club to a security dialogue where India's priorities like cross-border terrorism, terror financing, and cyber norms get equal billing. For the Global South, it signals that BRICS can produce policy language the West cannot ignore.
Second, the Doval-Wang Yi meeting was closely watched. Both sides described talks as "constructive and forward-looking," but readouts diverged sharply. India stressed "gradual normalisation" and "stable, predictable, constructive" ties, with the subtext that no reset is possible until the LAC stabilises. Peace on the contested border remains the precondition for broader engagement. China pushed to "respect each other's core interests" and "place the border issue in an appropriate position so it doesn't affect the overall situation," meaning compartmentalising the border issue and resuming trade, flights, and technology transfer. The gap is sequencing: India wants trust first, then normalisation; China wants to delink the LAC and move ahead without consensual settlement. Hosting Wang while sticking to its stand shows Delhi's new approach: engage with rivals multilaterally but do not concede bilaterally.
Third, Doval met counterparts from Brazil, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Iran's Deputy Secretary for Defence Affairs, burnishing India's plurilateral security diplomacy. The subtext: BRICS is not China-plus. Delhi deepened ties with Africa and West Asia, discussed developmental cooperation, and reviewed the West Asia situation amid the US-Iran detente. BRICS is becoming India's preferred platform to highlight Global South issues without being seen as anti-West.
Implications for Global Geopolitics
The meeting did not address the India-China border dispute or create a standing BRICS army. It proved that BRICS can function despite core rivalries and that India can chair it without choosing between Washington and Beijing. This signals a more fragmented, contradictory order—a contrapolar world. The US no longer sets the global security agenda, and China cannot command BRICS loyalty. India has potential to emerge as a swing state that can consensually manage contradictions. Delhi must introspect objectively and course-correct based on lessons from the recent West Asia tilt.
