The Delhi High Court has ruled that a daughter-in-law cannot claim a right to continue residing in property exclusively owned by her sister-in-law once the husband's permissive occupation of the premises ceases. The Court emphasized that matrimonial disputes between spouses should not burden a sister-in-law who had allowed the couple to live in her property out of goodwill.
Justice Neena Bansal Krishna dismissed a Regular Second Appeal filed by a woman challenging concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, which directed her to vacate the property and hand over possession to her sister-in-law.
The Court observed: "Once the right of Munish Kumar itself was terminated and he also vacated the premises, the status of the Appellant becomes no better than that of a trespasser and she is liable to vacate the property."
Background of the Case
The dispute concerned property bearing No. 2-A/44, Ground Floor and Second Floor along with terrace rights situated at Ramesh Nagar, New Delhi. The property originally belonged to Maya Devi, mother of the plaintiff Meera Batra and her brother Munish Kumar Lakhina. During her lifetime, Maya Devi executed a Will dated February 6, 2012, bequeathing the ground floor and second floor to Meera Batra. She passed away on May 20, 2012, after which Meera Batra became the owner of the property.
Munish Kumar, who had already divorced his first wife, was residing in the premises with his minor daughter. According to Meera Batra, her brother requested permission to continue staying in the ground floor portion, which she granted considering their relationship. After Munish Kumar married Shalu in October 2012, the appellant also started residing in the property.
The plaintiff alleged that after the marriage, both defendants began harassing family members and pressuring her to transfer the property in their favor. She further claimed that the daughter of Munish Kumar from his first marriage was subjected to such harassment that the child eventually came into the plaintiff's custody.
Claiming that she was no longer willing to allow the defendants to remain in the premises, Meera Batra issued a legal notice dated July 2, 2015, terminating their license and calling upon them to vacate the property. She also alleged that attempts were made to create third-party rights in the property through property dealers, though those attempts failed due to timely intervention, necessitating the institution of a suit seeking possession and permanent injunction.
Husband Admitted He Was a Licensee
In his written statement, Munish Kumar admitted that he had already left the premises along with his daughter and claimed no independent right in the property. He stated that only some articles belonging to him and his daughter remained inside the house and that he had not been able to retrieve them because of the appellant. He further claimed that matrimonial disputes had made his life miserable and that he had repeatedly been called to the police station. Importantly, he never disputed his sister's ownership and acknowledged that he had been residing in the property only with her permission.
On the other hand, the appellant alleged that the suit was collusive and had been filed by her husband and sister-in-law merely to deprive her of her matrimonial home. She also questioned the genuineness of the Will executed by Maya Devi.
The Trial Court held that the Will had been duly proved and that Meera Batra had become the absolute owner of the property after the death of Maya Devi. It further held that the appellant had failed to establish any domestic relationship with the plaintiff and that she had merely entered the property because her husband had been allowed to reside there. Accordingly, the suit was decreed and the appellant was directed to hand over possession. The First Appellate Court reappreciated the evidence and affirmed the findings.
Aggrieved by these concurrent findings, the appellant approached the Delhi High Court in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Before the High Court, the appellant argued that the Will was forged and fabricated and attacked the testimony of one of the attesting witnesses, Suman Lata. The Court rejected these submissions and noted that both attesting witnesses had entered the witness box and proved the execution of the Will. Therefore, the Court found no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below regarding the ownership of the plaintiff.
Wife Cannot Claim Better Rights Than Husband
Justice Neena Bansal Krishna noted that the appellant entered the property only after her marriage and had merely joined her husband, who himself occupied the premises as a permissive user. The Court observed that once the husband's license stood terminated and he himself had vacated the property, the appellant could not claim a superior right.
The Court said: "First and foremost, it is her husband Munish Kumar who had been permitted to occupy the Suit premises and after marriage she had merely joined him to reside in the Suit property, as his family member." According to the Court, the appellant's possession had no independent legal foundation once the husband's right had come to an end.
The appellant further argued that the premises constituted her shared household under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. However, the Court noted that she and the plaintiff had never jointly occupied the property or shared a common domestic arrangement. Agreeing with the findings of the subordinate courts, the High Court held that no domestic relationship existed between the parties and therefore the appellant could not assert any right to continue occupying the property on that basis.
The appellant further argued that concepts such as "shared household" and "domestic relationship" could only be examined by a Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under the Domestic Violence Act. The Court rejected the argument and referred to Section 26 of the Domestic Violence Act and observed that reliefs under the Act are not confined only to proceedings before the Magistrate. The Court clarified that the Trial Court had merely examined whether any legal protection was available to the appellant and had rightly concluded that none existed in the facts of the case. Therefore, the subordinate courts had committed no error in referring to the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act.
The appellant also alleged collusion between her husband and sister-in-law and pointed out that Munish Kumar had practically admitted the plaintiff's case. The Court, however, observed that the allegations of collusion could have assumed significance only if the material facts themselves were disputed. Since the ownership of the property and the permissive nature of the husband's occupation were never seriously challenged, the Court held that no inference of collusion could be drawn. The Court observed: "While she may claim that there is collusion, but in the facts and circumstances of the case, no collusion is evident."
Remedy Lies Against Husband, Not Sister-in-Law
Relying on Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja and Navneet Arora v. Surinder Kaur, the appellant argued that her husband ought to have been directed to provide alternate accommodation. The High Court noted that the appellant herself had admitted that proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act were already pending against her husband. Therefore, any claim relating to residence rights or alternate accommodation had to be pursued against the husband and not against the plaintiff.
Emphasizing that matrimonial discord cannot become a burden upon third parties, Justice Neena Bansal Krishna observed: "The discord inter-se the husband and the wife cannot become a penalty for a sister-in-law, who in good faith, had permitted them to occupy her Suit property."
The Court ultimately held that no substantial question of law arose for consideration under Section 100 CPC. Since both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court had correctly appreciated the evidence and arrived at concurrent findings, no interference was warranted. Accordingly, the Regular Second Appeal was dismissed.
Case Title: RSA 22/2022 Shalu v. Meera Batra & Anr.
Bench: Justice Neena Bansal Krishna
Date of Decision: June 5, 2026
For Appellant: Mr. Mohammad Sajid and Mr. Abdullah Bin Masood, Advocates with Appellant in person.
For Respondents: Mr. Tushar Sannu, Ms. Pulak Gupta Joshi and Ms. Payal Rajput, Advs.
